About
The Russo-Ukrainian War is a crucible of modern military innovation and has seen adaptation at
every echelon, which the British Army is seeking to learn lessons from. In particular, the
emergence of brigade-level commercial contracting within the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) has
captured the imagination of its commanders. However, such an approach has inherent
opportunities, risks and consequences. Ultimately, a Ukrainian brigade is not analogous to a British
one and the Army has higher echelons of capable Division and Corps headquarters. Through a
blended approach, these can serve to manage a system of 'decentralised' commerical contracting
whilst mitigating the risks of tactical and institutional fragmentation. The British Army has to be
discerning in which lessons it chooses to learn and adapt from.
Over the course of Russo-Ukrainian War, beginning with the seizure of Crimea in 2014 and
through the full-scale invasion in 2022, the AFU has "radically pivoted its approach to military
innovation" and evolved a dual-track scheme to develop and procure military technologies. On the
one hand, it operates a 'centralised' system orchestrated by the Ukrainian government and AFU
command headquarters. This principally coordinates the flow of western-supplied equipment and
seeks to manage sovereign industrial output. On the other, a 'decentralised' system has evolved
with individual AFU brigades working directly with the commercial sector. By this latter approach,
technology and equipment moves from factory to frontline at ever increasing speeds but this
comes at the detriment of force standardisation and integration.
This decentralised model of brigade-level procurement is attractive for those seeking to address
criticisms of the MOD's "sluggish procurement processes". But the question is not whether to
replicate the entire approach, which emerged from existential necessity to meet specific
operational conditions, but rather to discern which elements might be adopted. The goal being to
enhance MOD procurement without undermining the coherence that British industry and military
requires. To do so it must understand the genesis of the AFU's brigade-level procurement model,
consider the relative weight of opportunities vs risks and adapt them to Britain's own unique
context.
Origin Story
The Ukrainian state in 2014 lacked sufficient funds to address its force's equipment deficits and
regenerate units, which saw private citizens from across civil society fill the gap. This social
phenomenon accelerated in February 2022 as numbers joining the AFU increased, with many of
the new soldiers bringing significant personal wealth and business resource with them into service.
Commerical enterprise and industrial companies became intertwined at the lowest tactical levels
with frontline units. These in turn – which until recently were the largest AFU tactical formations –
developed an entrepreneurial attitude to procurement.
Thus emerged the 'decentralised' approach evident today. It grew organically to bypass traditional
bureaucratic channels to enable speed of delivery and embed battlefield feedback into industrial
procurement cycles. Critically, it also emerged in the absence of functional headquarters (for
example Division and Corps) between the brigades and the AFU central command. The system
was neither designed nor deliberate and as a result capacity varies across brigades. This is
because of three fundamental tensions: tactical agility vs force standardisation; operational
responsiveness vs industrial sustainability; and strategic mobilisation vs coherent force design.
Tactical Agility vs Force Standardisation
Brigade contracting has delivered a procurement cycle measured in days rather than months and
years. Ukrainian forces can get drones, communications equipment and logistics enablement with
unprecedented speed, allowing them to respond to Russian Forces in near-real time. CEPA noted
the AFU's "response to the logistical challenges o...
every echelon, which the British Army is seeking to learn lessons from. In particular, the
emergence of brigade-level commercial contracting within the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) has
captured the imagination of its commanders. However, such an approach has inherent
opportunities, risks and consequences. Ultimately, a Ukrainian brigade is not analogous to a British
one and the Army has higher echelons of capable Division and Corps headquarters. Through a
blended approach, these can serve to manage a system of 'decentralised' commerical contracting
whilst mitigating the risks of tactical and institutional fragmentation. The British Army has to be
discerning in which lessons it chooses to learn and adapt from.
Over the course of Russo-Ukrainian War, beginning with the seizure of Crimea in 2014 and
through the full-scale invasion in 2022, the AFU has "radically pivoted its approach to military
innovation" and evolved a dual-track scheme to develop and procure military technologies. On the
one hand, it operates a 'centralised' system orchestrated by the Ukrainian government and AFU
command headquarters. This principally coordinates the flow of western-supplied equipment and
seeks to manage sovereign industrial output. On the other, a 'decentralised' system has evolved
with individual AFU brigades working directly with the commercial sector. By this latter approach,
technology and equipment moves from factory to frontline at ever increasing speeds but this
comes at the detriment of force standardisation and integration.
This decentralised model of brigade-level procurement is attractive for those seeking to address
criticisms of the MOD's "sluggish procurement processes". But the question is not whether to
replicate the entire approach, which emerged from existential necessity to meet specific
operational conditions, but rather to discern which elements might be adopted. The goal being to
enhance MOD procurement without undermining the coherence that British industry and military
requires. To do so it must understand the genesis of the AFU's brigade-level procurement model,
consider the relative weight of opportunities vs risks and adapt them to Britain's own unique
context.
Origin Story
The Ukrainian state in 2014 lacked sufficient funds to address its force's equipment deficits and
regenerate units, which saw private citizens from across civil society fill the gap. This social
phenomenon accelerated in February 2022 as numbers joining the AFU increased, with many of
the new soldiers bringing significant personal wealth and business resource with them into service.
Commerical enterprise and industrial companies became intertwined at the lowest tactical levels
with frontline units. These in turn – which until recently were the largest AFU tactical formations –
developed an entrepreneurial attitude to procurement.
Thus emerged the 'decentralised' approach evident today. It grew organically to bypass traditional
bureaucratic channels to enable speed of delivery and embed battlefield feedback into industrial
procurement cycles. Critically, it also emerged in the absence of functional headquarters (for
example Division and Corps) between the brigades and the AFU central command. The system
was neither designed nor deliberate and as a result capacity varies across brigades. This is
because of three fundamental tensions: tactical agility vs force standardisation; operational
responsiveness vs industrial sustainability; and strategic mobilisation vs coherent force design.
Tactical Agility vs Force Standardisation
Brigade contracting has delivered a procurement cycle measured in days rather than months and
years. Ukrainian forces can get drones, communications equipment and logistics enablement with
unprecedented speed, allowing them to respond to Russian Forces in near-real time. CEPA noted
the AFU's "response to the logistical challenges o...